FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL DECISION
Bill Keveney and The Hartford Courant,
Complainants
against Docket #FIC 90-64
Hartford Court of Common Council,
Respondent February 13, 1991
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on June 5, 1990, at which time the complainant and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S.
2. By letter of complaint dated February 15, 1990 and filed with the Commission on February 20, 1990, the complainants appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent at its January 22, 1990 meeting discussed in executive session police issues not within the scope of 1-18a(e), and requesting that a civil penalty be assessed the members of the respondent.
3. It is found that at its regular meeting of January 22, 1990 the respondent convened in executive session with the city police chief and the deputy corporation counsel for the stated purpose of matters concerning security strategy and the deployment of security personnel.
4. It is found that, while convened in executive session, the chief of police informed the respondent of his alternative strategies for the deployment of police officers, including foot patrol officers and mounted horse patrol officers, and how that deployment was affected by an increase in crime and staffing problems due to attrition, a shortage of supervisors, an existing consent decree, school guard requirements, a delay in the police recruitment class, and the possible utilization of state police personnel.
5. It is found that the essence of the chief's presentation in executive session concerned alternative methods of officer deployment based on a background of reduced personnel.
Docket #FIC 90-64 Page 2
6. It is found that, after reconvening in public session, the respondent voted to fill certain foot patrol positions.
7. The complainant maintains that the scope of 1-18a(e)(3), G.S., should be restricted to discussions of specific criminal investigations or efforts to protect people, as where public discussion would compromise an investigation or result in harm to an individual.
8. It is concluded, however, that the language of 1-18a(e)(3), G.S., does not require the respondent to demonstrate prejudice to a specific investigation or harm to individuals.
9. The complainant also maintains that not all of the discussion in executive session was within the scope of 1-18a(e)(3), G.S., in that the respondent discussed staffing levels and other public interest issues that residents were present to hear discussed, and that the respondent's purpose for convening in executive session was to avoid a public airing of politically sensitive issues.
10. It is found that approximately 25% of the chief's presentation to the respondent consisted of background information relevant to a discussion of deployment strategies.
11. It is found that some of the chief's background discussion of staffing shortages and their causes was inextricably interwoven with his presentation of deployment strategies, and that deployment issues could not have been totally divorced from the background issues.
12. It is also found, however, that a portion of the discussion in executive session, particularly that with the deputy corporation counsel, concerned the effect of the consent decree on hiring procedures, an issue which could reasonably have been separated from the topic of deployment strategies.
13. The respondent additionally maintains that the portion of the executive session described in paragraph 12, above, was permissible under 1-18a(e)(2), G.S., as it concerned the effect of the consent decree on hiring procedures.
14. It is found that strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims and litigation within the meaning of 1-18a(e)(2), G.S., was not a stated purpose for the executive session.
15. It is also found that the respondent failed to prove that its discussion in executive session concerned strategy or negotiation with respect to the consent decree.
16. It is concluded therefore that the respondent violated 1-21(a), G.S., by exceeding the permissible scope of the executive session as defined in 1-18a(e)(3), G.S.
Docket #FIC 90-64 Page 3
17. Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission in its discretion declines to impose a civil penalty against the respondent.
The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:
1. Henceforth the respondent shall act in strict compliance with the requirements of 1-21(a) and 1-18a(e), G.S.
Approved by order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of February 13, 1991.
Tina C. Frappier
Acting Clerk of the Commission
Docket #FIC 90-64 Page 4
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
BILL KEVENEY AND THE HARTFORD COURANT
285 Broad Street
Hartford, CT 06115
HARTFORD COURT OF COMMON COUNCIL
c/o H. Maria Cone, Esq.
Office of the Corp. Counsel
550 Main Street
Hartford, CT 06103
Tina C. Frappier
Acting Clerk of the Commission