FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
In the Matter of a Complaint
by Final Decision
Gerald R. Karp,
Complainant
against Docket
#FIC 91-53
Chief, Newington Volunteer
Ambulance,
Respondent February 26, 1992
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested
case on May 20, 1991 and January 6, 1992, at which times the complainant and
the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony,
exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the
following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. By letter
dated February 25, 1991 and filed February 26, 1991 the complainant appealed to
the Commission alleging that the respondent denied access to certain records of
the respondent's department, the Newington Volunteer Ambulance (hereinafter
"department").
2. At the
hearing on this matter the respondent conceded that his department does not
currently follow the provisions of the Freedom of Information (hereinafter
"FOI") Act.
3. It is
concluded that the test for determining whether an agency such as the
department is a public agency for purposes of 1-18a(a), G.S., is one of
functional equivalence, as outlined by the Supreme Court in Board of Trustees of
Woodstock Academy, et al. v. Freedom of Information Commission, et al., 181
Conn. 544 (1980). The Court has
concluded that the criteria to be utilized in determining whether an entity
such as the respondent is the functional equivalent of a public agency are (1)
the level of governmental funding; (2) the extent of government involvement or
regulation; (3) whether the entity performs a governmental function; and (4)
whether the entity was created by the government.
Docket #FIC 91-53 Page
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4. It is further
concluded, based upon Connecticut Humane Society v. FOI Commission, 218 Conn.
757, 761 (1991), that "all four factors are not necessary for a finding of
functional equivalence, but that all relevant factors are to be considered
cumulatively, with no single factor being essential or conclusive."
5. It is
found that the department's two ambulances are insured under policies covering
the town of Newington (hereinafter "town"); that the town provides
gasoline for the department's ambulances; that the town pays for the
department's general equipment maintenance; that the town provides worker's
compensation coverage for members of the department; that with the exception of
telephone services, the town pays for the department's utility costs; that the town
permits the department to use one of the town buildings to house the
department's ambulances; and that the department does not pay rent to the town
for use of its building nor does it pay for building maintenance.
6. It is
found that the department receives annual funding from the town which ranged
from approximately 15% of the department's budget in 1989 to approximately
one-half of the department's budget in 1990.
7. It is
concluded that a substantial portion of the department's costs and expenses are
paid for with public funds.
8. It is
found that the department is subject to state statutes that govern Emergency
Medical Services pursuant to 19a-175, G.S., et seq.
9. It is
further found that the department is subject to the regulations of the state's
Office of Emergency Medical Services, pursuant to 19a-178 - 179, G.S.
10. It is
concluded that the respondent's department is subject to substantial government
involvement or regulation.
11. Section
19a-183, G.S., requires the establishment of regional emergency medical
services councils, comprised of towns designated by the Commissioner of Health
Services.
12. Section
19a-184, G.S., requires emergency medical services councils to forward to the
Commissioner of Health Services an emergency medical services plan for its
region.
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13. Section
19a-182(b), G.S., requires each emergency medical services council to develop
and annually revise a plan for the delivery of emergency medical services in
its area.
14. Section
19a-175(k), G.S., provides that if no emergency medical services council exists
within a region, the Commissioner of Health Services shall develop in
conjunction with the regional coordinator the emergency medical services plan
for such region.
15. It is
found that the provision of emergency ambulance transportation services are
among the required components of an emergency medical services plan pursuant to
19a-175, G.S., et seq.
16. Section
19a-190, G.S, provides that a municipality may contract with a volunteer
ambulance company for the performance of ambulance services.
17. It is
found that the town has a contract with the department as provided for in
19a-190, G.S.
18. It is
found that the town contracts with a private vendor to provide ambulance
services during the hours when the department is not in operation.
19. It is
concluded, based upon the statutes set forth in paragraphs 11 through 18 above,
that emergency medical services, including ambulance services, are a
governmental function.
20. It is
concluded therefore that the department and the respondent, as its chief,
perform a governmental function.
21. It is
found that the department was incorporated as a non-stock corporation under
state law by a group of individuals and that the department's members elect its
board of directors and officers.
22.
Consequently, it is concluded that the department was not specifically
created by government.
23.
Nonetheless, it is concluded, based on the totality of relevant factors,
that the department and the respondent, as its chief, constitute public
agencies within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S., and are therefore subject
to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
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24. By
letters dated December 13, 1990 and February 9, 1991 the complainant requested
from the respondent copies of the following: a) the minutes of the respondent's
meeting during which there was a determination of his guilt or innocence; b)
the agenda for said meeting; and c) the letter that was sent to him apprising
him that he would be discussed during the meeting.
25. In the
complainant's February 9, 1991 letter, he also made a request for copies of any
complaints that were lodged against him.
26. It is
found that by letters to the complainant dated December 26, 1990 and February
19, 1991, the respondent indicated that no formal meeting took place prior to
the suspension of the complainant's driving privileges, and that therefore no
meeting agenda or minutes exist.
27. It is
found that in the respondent's February 19, 1991 letter he also informed the
complainant that he would provide him with a copy of the written complaint
against him when the complainant made an appointment to pick it up.
28. It is
found that in the respondent's December 26, 1990 letter, he advised the
complainant that as a matter of standard operating procedure, he decided to
temporarily suspend the complainant's driving privileges following the receipt
of several oral and one written complaint concerning the complainant's alleged
unsafe ambulance operation.
29. It is
found that in the respondent's December 26, 1990 letter, he further indicated
that the complainant's driving privileges were suspended only until the
complainant met with the department's assistant chief to discuss the
complaints.
30. It is
found that on or about November 29, 1990 the department's assistant chief spoke
with the complainant concerning the complaints, discussed ambulance operating
procedures and thereafter rescinded the complainant's suspended status.
31. It is
found that neither the respondent's decision to temporarily revoke the
complainant's driving privileges nor the November 29, 1990 discussion between
the complainant and the department's assistant chief constituted a
"meeting" of a public agency within the meaning of 1-18a(b),
G.S.
32. It is
concluded therefore, that the respondent did not violate the FOI Act by failing
to provide the complainant with a
Docket #FIC 91-53 Page
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copy of an agenda or meeting
minutes in response to his request.
33. It is
further concluded that the respondent did not violate the FOI Act with respect
to the complainant's request for copies of any written complaints lodged
against him.
The following order by the Commission is hereby
recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned
complaint:
1. The
complaint is hereby dismissed.
2. The
Commission notes the respondent's concession in paragraph 2 of the findings,
above, and reminds the respondent, that both he and the department, as public
agencies within the meaning of 1-18a(a), G.S., are obligated to comply
with the provisions of the FOI Act.
Approved by Order of the
Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of February 26, 1992.
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the
Commission
Docket #FIC 91-53 Page
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PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c),
G.S. THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING
ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR
THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED
CASE ARE:
Gerald R. Karp
Karp Insurance Group, Inc.
241 Main Street, 5N
Hartford, CT 06106
Richard Scanlon
Chief, Newington Volunteer
Ambulance
John Stewart Drive
Newington, CT 06111
Debra L. Rembowski
Acting Clerk of the
Commission