Freedom
of Information Commission
of
the State of Connecticut
In the Matter of a Complaint by Final
Decision
Francine Cimino,
Complainant
against Docket
#FIC 1996-056
Chief of Police, Glastonbury Police
Department; Town Manager, Town of
Glastonbury; and Town of Glastonbury,
Respondents September
25, 1996
The
above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on June 20, 1996, at which
time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts
and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. At the hearing on this matter, Dennis
Daigneault requested to be made a party respondent to this appeal, which
request was granted by the undersigned hearing officer.
After
consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and
conclusions of law are reached:
1. The town respondents are public agencies
within the meaning of §1-18a(a), G.S.
2.
By letter dated February 9 and received February 13, 1996, the
complainant, a Glastonbury police officer, requested that the respondent chief
provide her with a copy of the internal investigation involving herself and
respondent Daigneault.
3.
By letter dated and filed February 20, 1996, the complainant appealed to
the Commission alleging that the respondent chief violated the Freedom of
Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to provide her with the requested internal
investigation report.
4. It is
found that the respondent chief maintains an internal investigation report
concerning allegations of sexual harassment involving the complainant and
respondent Daigneault, identified as case no. 93-18749 (hereinafter “report”).
5. It is
found that the report is a public record within the meaning of §§1-18a(d) and 1-19(a), G.S.
6. It is
found that the respondent chief forwarded the complainant’s request to the
respondent town manager, who received it on February 23, 1996.
7. It is
found that by letter dated February 27, 1996, the Director of Human Resources
for the Town of Glastonbury (hereinafter “the town”) informed the complainant
that respondent Daigneault had been notified of her request, in accordance with
§1-20a(b), G.S., and that he
had a seven day period within which to file an objection to disclosure of the
report.
8. It is
found that by letter dated February 28, 1996, and received by the respondent
town manager on March 1, 1996, respondent Daigneault objected to the release of
the report to the complainant.
9. It is
found that by letter dated March 1, 1996, the town Director of Human Resources
informed the complainant that because an objection to her request had been
filed by respondent Daigneault, the town could not comply with her request
pursuant to §1-20a(b), G.S.
10. Sections 1-20a(b) and (c), G.S., in relevant
part, provide:
“(b) Whenever a public
agency receives a request to inspect or copy records contained in any of its
employees personnel or medical files and similar files and the agency
reasonably believes that the disclosure of such records would legally
constitute an invasion of privacy, the agency shall immediately notify
in writing (1) each employee concerned, provided such notice shall not be
required to be in writing where impractical due to the large number of
employees concerned and (2) the collective bargaining representative, if any,
of each employee concerned. Nothing
herein shall require an agency to withhold from disclosure the contents of
personnel or medical files and similar files when it does not reasonably
believe that such disclosure would legally constitute an invasion of personal
privacy.
(c) A public agency which
has provided notice under subsection (b) of this section shall disclose the
records requested unless it receives a written objection from the employee
concerned or the employee’s collective bargaining representative, if any,
within seven business days from the receipt by the employee or such collective
bargaining representative of the notice or, if there is no evidence of receipt
of written notice, not later than nine business days from the date the notice is
actually mailed, sent, posted or otherwise given. Each objection filed under this subsection shall be on a form
prescribed by the public agency, which shall consist of a statement to be
signed by the employee or the employee’s collective bargaining representative,
under the penalties of false statement, that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it and that the
objection is not interposed for delay.
Upon the filing of an objection as provided in this subsection,
the agency shall not disclose the requested records unless ordered to do so by
the freedom of information commission pursuant to section 1-21i.” … [Emphasis
added.]
11. The town
respondents do not object to the disclosure of the report, but maintain that
they were not permitted to release it after an objection had been filed
pursuant to §1-20a(b), G.S.
12. It is found, however, that the town failed
to provide a prescribed objection form along with their notification to
respondent Daigneault, as mandated by §1-20a(c), G.S.
13. It is therefore concluded that the
respondents did not properly invoke the mandatory stay provisions of §1-20a(c), G.S.
14. The respondent Daigneault maintains that the
report is exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§1-19(b)(2) and
1-19(b)(3)(G), G.S., and requested that his counsel be granted limited access
to the report, which was submitted for in camera inspection, because he
claims that such access is necessary to prove the above-claimed exemptions.
15. It is indeed ironic that respondent
Daigneault now seeks access for his own purposes to the very document he wishes
to prevent the complainant from obtaining.
16. It is found that respondent Daigneault, who
resigned from the town police department after the commencement of the subject
internal investigation, was questioned concerning the allegations in the report
and was aware of the nature of the allegations made against him in the subject
report.
17. Nonetheless, provision is hereby granted to
respondent Daigneault’s counsel, after execution of a protective order
prohibiting him from disclosing the contents of the report to anyone during the
pendency of the case and until further order by the Commission, to inspect the
subject record held in camera by the Commission.
18. With respect to the claimed exemptions, §1-19(b)(2), G.S., permits
the nondisclosure of “personnel or medical and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”
19. The two-part test for the application of the
§1-19(b)(2), G.S., exemption
first requires a finding that the record at issue constitutes a personnel,
medical or similar file and, if so, then a finding that disclosure would
constitute an invasion of personal privacy.
Disclosure only constitutes an invasion of personal privacy when the
information sought does not pertain to a legitimate matter of public concern
and is highly offensive to a reasonable person. Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn.
158 (1993).
20. It is found that the subject report is
similar to a personnel file with respect to respondent Daigneault.
21. It is found that the investigation of
allegations of misconduct against a police officer is a legitimate matter of
public concern. Consequently, it is not
necessary for the Commission to consider whether disclosure of the report would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
22. Accordingly, it is concluded that the report
is not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-19(b)(2), G.S.
23. Section 1-19(b)(3)(G), G.S., permits the
nondisclosure of:
records of law enforcement
agencies not otherwise available to the public which records were compiled
in connection with the detection or investigation of crime, if the
disclosure of said records would not be in the public interest because it would
result in the disclosure of uncorroborated allegations subject to destruction
pursuant to section 1-20c. [Emphasis
added.]
24. Section 1-20c, G.S., provides:
Except for records the
retention of which is otherwise controlled by law or regulation, records of law
enforcement agencies consisting of uncorroborated allegations that an
individual has engaged in criminal activity shall be reviewed by the law
enforcement agency one year after the creation of such records. If the existence of the alleged criminal
activity cannot be corroborated within ninety days of the commencement of such
review, the law enforcement agency shall destroy such records.
25. It is found that the subject internal
investigation report was compiled in connection with the investigation of
alleged violations of administrative regulations and civil sexual harassment
statutes and was not compiled in connection with the detection or investigation
of crime.
26. It is found that because he resigned from
his employment with the town police department, respondent Daigneault was never
charged with, or disciplined for, the allegations made in the report.
27. It is further found that even if the report
had been compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of crime,
the allegations contained within the report were corroborated.
28. It is therefore concluded that the subject
internal investigation report is not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-19(b)(3)(G), G.S.
29. It is concluded that the respondents
violated §1-19(a), G.S., by failing to
promptly provide the complainant with a copy of the requested internal
investigation report.
The
following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the
record concerning the above-captioned complaint:
1. The town respondents shall immediately
provide the complainant with a copy of the requested internal investigation
report, free of charge.
2. Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly
comply with the requirements of §§1-19(a) and 1-20a(c), G.S.
Approved
by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of
September 25, 1996.
__________________________
Elizabeth
A. Leifert
Acting Clerk of the
Commission
PURSUANT
TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE
MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION,
OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE
PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Francine
Cimino
41
Wapping Avenue
South
Windsor, CT 06074
Chief of Police, Glastonbury Police Department; Town
Manager, Town of Glastonbury; and Town of Glastonbury,
c/o William S. Rogers, Esq.
Tyler,
Cooper & Alcorn
CityPlace
35th Floor
Hartford,
CT 06103-3488
Christopher
R. Stone, Esq.
Chadwick,
Libbey, Szilagyi & Stone
555
Franklin Avenue
Hartford,
CT 06114
__________________________
Elizabeth
A. Leifert
Acting
Clerk of the Commission