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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COMMISSION |
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In
the Matter of a Complaint by |
FINAL
DECISION |
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Marie
Iadarola Fadus, |
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Complainants |
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against
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Docket
#FIC 1999-106 |
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Margaret H. Dignoti, Registered Agent, |
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Respondents |
February
23, 2000 |
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The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested
case on December 15, 1999, at which time the complainant and the respondent
appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and
argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the
following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1.
By letter dated
February 18, 1999, the complainant requested that the respondent provide her
with certain information and copies of records maintained by the respondent.
2.
It is found that the
respondent did not respond to the complainant’s February 18, 1999 request
letter.
3.
By letter dated March
1, 1999, and filed on March 5, 1999, the complainant appealed to this
Commission alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”)
Act by failing to respond to and thereby denying her request.
The complainant requested the imposition of civil penalties.
4.
At the hearing on
this matter, the respondent argued that the Connecticut Coalition For
Inclusive Education (hereinafter “CCIE”) is not a public agency within the
meaning of §1-200(1), G.S., [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.], and the respondent
therefore is not required under the FOI Act to comply with the complainant’s
request.
5.
The dispositive issue
in this case is whether CCIE and the respondent register agent, are the
functional equivalents of public agencies and consequently are subject to the
requirements of the FOI Act.
6.
Section
1-200(1), G.S. [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.], defines a “public agency” or
“agency” to mean:
. . .
any executive, administrative or legislative office of . . . any political
subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, any department,
institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official of . . . any
city, town, borough, municipal corporation, school district, regional district
or other district or other political subdivision of the state, including any
committee of, or created by, any such office, subdivision, agency, department,
institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official . . . .
7.
In Board of
Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. FOI Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 554 (1980)
(“Woodstock”), the Supreme Court adopted the “functional equivalent”
test to determine whether an entity is a public agency within the meaning of
§1-200(1), G.S. [formerly §1-18a(1), G.S.].
The test for functional equivalence to a public agency consists of the
following four criteria; (1) whether the entity performs a governmental
function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) the extent of government
involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the entity was created by
government.
8.
Subsequently, in Connecticut
Humane Society v. FOI Commission, 218 Conn. 757, 761 (1991), the Supreme
Court elaborated that all four factors set forth in Woodstock are not
necessary for a finding of functional equivalence, but rather that “all
relevant factors are to be considered cumulatively, with no single factor
being essential or conclusive.”
9.
With respect to the
first criterion of the functional equivalent test (whether the entity performs
a governmental function), it is found that CCIE primarily engages in advocacy
on behalf of individuals who have mental disabilities, and their families, for
the inclusion of children with mental disabilities in regular classrooms in
public schools within the State of Connecticut.
CCIE further provides training to parents of children with mental
disabilities concerning how to exercise their rights with respect to their
children in the public school systems in Connecticut.
10. It is found that CCIE’s specific purposes, as
set forth in its certificate of incorporation are:
“a. broadening
opportunities for students with disabilities to be educated with their
non-disabled peers in the school they would attend if not disabled,
b.
assist individual
families and students to achieve such inclusive educational programs; and
c.
solicit
funds for the accomplishment of the above purposes.”
11.
Although the purposes
set forth in CCIE’s certificate of incorporation do not relate to a
traditional or historically governmental function, §17a-210, G.S.,
establishes the state Department of Mental Retardation and it provides in
relevant part that:
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. . The Department of Mental Retardation . . . shall be responsible for the
planning development and administration of complete, comprehensive and
integrated state-wide services for persons with mental retardation and persons
medically diagnosed as having Prader-Willi syndrome.
The Department of Mental Retardation shall be under the supervision of
the Commissioner of Mental Retardation . . . [who] shall be responsible
. . . for the planning and developing complete, comprehensive and integrated
state-wide services for persons with mental retardation; for implementation
and where appropriate the funding of such services; and for the coordination
of the efforts of the Department of Mental Retardation with those of other
state departments and agencies, municipal governments and private agencies
concerned with and providing services for persons with mental retardation.
12.
It is found that CCIE
does not provide the services described in paragraph 9, above, pursuant to any
contract with Department of Mental Retardation or any government entity, or
pursuant to any statutory mandate.
13.
It is concluded
therefore that CCIE does not perform a government function.
14.
With respect to the
second criterion of the functional equivalent test (the level of government
funding), it is found that CCIE’s only government funding is through a grant
from the Connecticut Developmental Disabilities Council (hereinafter “CDDC”)
to subcontract and administer such subcontracts for programs that train
teachers, schools, and parents on including children with disabilities in
public schools.
15.
It is further found
that the services that CCIE provides for CDDC are incidental to its primary
function and that CCIE would still function and operate without the grant from
CDDC.
16.
It is concluded that
CCIE is not substantially funded by the government.
17.
With respect to the
third criterion of the functional equivalent test (the extent of government
involvement or regulation), it is found that CCIE is governed by a board of
directors. It is further found
that there are no governmental appointments to the board of directors.
18.
It is further found
that the board of directors is responsible for the conduct of CCIE, without
any control by, or input from, government.
19.
It is found that
there is no evidence of any government regulation or control over the
operations of CCIE and that CCIE only submits an audit once a year to CDDC
with respect to the administration of the grant described in paragraph 14,
above.
20.
It is concluded that
CCIE is not significantly regulated by government.
21.
With respect to the
fourth criterion of the functional equivalent test (whether the entity was
created by government), it is found that CCIE was incorporated in the State of
Connecticut as a non-profit organization in 1989.
22.
It is further found
that the creators of CCIE consisted of parents of mentally disabled children
who were having problems with public school systems in Connecticut concerning
the methods used and policies regarding the education of children with mental
disabilities.
23.
It is concluded that
CCIE was not created by government.
24.
It is further
concluded that CCIE and consequently, the respondent registered agent are not
the functional equivalent of public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1),
G.S. [§1-18a(1), G.S.], and therefore are not subject to the jurisdiction of
this Commission.
25. In view of the
conclusion in paragraph 24, above, the Commission lacks jurisdiction to order
the disclosure of the information and records requested by the complainant in
her February 18, 1999 letter.
The
following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the
record concerning the above-captioned complaint.
1. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of
February 23, 2000.
_________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Marie Iadarola Fadus
c/o Michael J. Fadus
Eight Broad Street, Unit 82
Meriden, CT 06450
Margaret H. Dignoti, Registered Agent, Connecticut Coalition For Inclusive Education, Inc.
c/o Atty. Max P. Lapertosa and
Atty. Lionel A. Dyson
Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia
125 South Ninth Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19107
__________________________
Melanie R. Balfour
Acting Clerk of the Commission
FIC1999-106FD/mrb/02/25/00