FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Wendy John,

 

Complainants

 

 

against

Docket #FIC 2000-557

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General,
State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney
General; Wil Gundling, William McCullough,
Phillip Schulz, Margaret Chapple, Assistant
Attorneys General, State of Connecticut,
Office of the Attorney General; and State of
Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General,

 

 

Respondents

June 13, 2001

 

 

 

 

            The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on November 27, 2000 at 2:00 P.M., at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.  After presenting her case and using the majority of the time initially allotted for the hearing, and soon after the respondents began the presentation of their case, counsel for the complainant requested a continuance to a later date.  Such request was denied by the undersigned hearing officer.  After again requesting and being denied a continuance, counsel for the complainant and the complainant left the hearing.  The hearing thereafter proceeded to its conclusion. 

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

            2.  It is found that, on February 23, 1998, the complainant filed a complaint with the respondent Blumenthal against Matthew Beizer, an Assistant Attorney General [hereinafter “the Beizer complaint”] and that, on July 14, 1999, the complainant filed a grievance with the Statewide Grievance Committee against Mr. Beizer [hereinafter “the Beizer grievance”].  It is further found that both the Beizer complaint and the Beizer grievance arose out of Mr. Beizer’s representation of the State of Connecticut, University of Connecticut Health Center in a worker’s compensation action brought against such agency by the complainant [hereinafter “the John case”].   

           

3.   It is found that, by letter dated September 16, 2000, the complainant requested that the respondents provide her with copies of the following records, specifying that, for the purposes of such request, “‘documentary material’ means all written or graphic matter, however produced or reproduced, of every kind and description in your actual or constructive possession, custody, care, or control, including but not limited to: all correspondence, memoranda, writings, notes, drawings, investigations, "blue slips", agreements, records or recordings of oral conversations, sound tapes or recordings, time sheets or logs, computer printouts, data stored or maintained electronically, intra-office and interoffice memoranda, pencil and/or pen jottings, voice mail, e-mail, court papers, press releases, and any other written form of notation of events.”

 

           “a.  all documentary material relating to any claim or request for payment made by Matthew Beizer, Assistant Attorney General above and beyond his salary as an Assistant Attorney General including but not limited to:

 

(i)     Reimbursement for attorney fees;

(ii)   Any and all settlement agreements;

(iii)  Any claims that Matthew Beizer made under the Freedom of Information Act;

(iv)  Any and all claims that [Matthew] Beizer made under the Freedom of Information Act against Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General, [and] Associate Attorney General Wil Gundling;

(v)  Attorney fees in connection with disputes which Matt Beizer had against the Attorney General, the Office of the Attorney General, the State of Connecticut and Associate Attorney General Wil Gundling;

(vi) Any and all payments made to Matt Beizer and or Louis George, his attorney, as a result of negotiation of claims made by Matthew Beizer and handled by Attorney Carla Walworth, counsel to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, of Paul Hastings & Janofsky, LLP, 1055 Washington Boulevard, Stamford, CT 06901-2217;

(vii) Any and all documentary material prepared or obtained in the course of settlement negotiations, including but not limited to documentary materia1 prepared in the course of settlement discussions with Federal Magistrate Garfinkel.

 

           b.   Hourly and yearly salaries for the following individuals from October 1996 through October 2000 unless otherwise indicated:

 

            (i)     William McCullough, Assistant Attorney General;

            (ii)    William McCullough's secretary (ies);

            (iii)   Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General,

            (iv)   Richard Blumenthal’s secretary(ies);                              

            (v)    Brewster Blackall, Assistant Attorney General;              

            (vi)   Brewster Blackall's secretary(ies);                                 

            (vii)  Phillip Schulz, Assistant Attorney General;                     

           (viii) Phillip Schulz's secretary (ies);                                       

           (ix)   Matthew Beizer;

           (x)    Matthew Beizer's secretary (ies);

(xi)   Beverly O'Brien, for the period December 1998 to the present;

            (xii)  Sharon Scully, Assistant Attorney General;

            (xiii) Sharon Scully secretary (ies), for the period 9/99 to the

            present;

            (xiv) Clare Kindall, Assistant Attorney General, for the period 9/99

            to the present;

            (xv)  Clare Kindall’s secretary (ies), for the period 9/99 to the

            present;

            (xvi) Diana Guadalupe, secretary;

            (xvii) Jane Scholl, Associate Attorney General;

            (xviii) Jane Scholl's secretary (ies);

            (xix) Aaron Bayer, former Deputy General, (for the period

            February 1998 through

            March 2000);

            (xx) Evelyn Godbout; for the period 3/99 to the present;

            (xxi) Margaret Chapple, Assistant Attorney General; for the period

            2/98 to the present;

(xxii) Margaret Chapple's secretary (ies); for the period 2/98 to the present;

            (xxiii) Aaron Bayer's secretary(ies) (for the period February 1998

            through March 2000);

            (xxiv) All members of the Litigation Management Committee who

            reviewed Matthew Beizer’s Litigation Management Memo of

            March 17th, 1999, for the period 3/17/77 [sic] to 4/17/99;

           (xxv) Michelle Truglia, Assistant Attorney General for the period

           March 1999 to the present.

            (xxvi) Michelle Truglia's secretary(ies) for the period March 1999

            to the present.

            (xxvii) Linda Longo and or any other paralegal who worked on the

            Wendy John workers' compensation case.

             (xxviii) Charles Overend, former Assistant Attorney General, for

            the period of October l999 through June 2, 2000.”

 

            c.  All documentary material from Attorney Louis George or Mr.

           Beizer or any other representative of Mr. Beizer in regard to his

           claim against Richard Blumenthal, Wil Gundling, the State of

           Connecticut and the Office of the Attorney General. 

 

            d.  Any and all documentary evidence on which Richard

           Blumenthal relied for his response(s) to the Beizer complaint and

           the Beizer grievance. 

 

            e. Any and all documentary evidence on which Richard

           Blumenthal relied when he communicated with the Statewide

           Grievance Committee regarding the Beizer complaint. 

 

            f.  All documentary material from any employee of the Office of

           the Attorney General, or their legal representatives in regard to the

           John case.

 

            g.  All documentary material from any employee of the Office of

           the Attorney General, or their legal representative which addresses

           who authorized Mr. Beizer to take an appeal of the John case.

 

           h.  Any and all documentary material from any employee of the

           Office of the Attorney General including but not limited to: Richard

           Blumenthal, Phil Schulz, Brewster Blackall, and Bill McCullough

           regarding the Beizer complaint.

 

            i.  Any and all documentary material from any employee of the

           Office of the Attorney General, including but not limited to:

           Richard Blumenthal, Margaret Chapple, Phil Schulz, Brewster

           Blackall, and Bill McCullough, regarding the Beizer complaint. 

 

            j.  Any and all documentary material from any employee of the

           Office of the Attorney General or their legal representative

           regarding any investigations, meetings, conversations, "blue slips"

           "blue slip" drafts, blue slips “redrafts"' regarding the Beizer

           complaint.

 

           k.  Any and all documentary material between Richard

           Blumenthal, Margaret Chapple and Wil Gundling, Aaron Bayer,

           William McCullough, Phil Schulz, and Sharon Scully regarding

           Mr. Beizer's “misconduct” in the Wendy John workers’

           Compensation case.

            l.  Any and all documentary material/itemization of the amount of

           time by dates and hours and minutes that any and all employees of

           the Office of the Attorney General including but not limited to each

           of the employees listed in paragraph 3.b, above, or any other spent

           on the John case from October 1994 to the present.

           m.  Any and all documentary material prepared or obtained in the

           course of the Beizer grievance.

 

           n.  List of al1 the employees of the Office of the Attorney General

           who were interviewed and time which they spent and/ or attended

           the grievance hearings in March, May and September, 2000

           regarding the Beizer grievance. 

 

           o.  Any and all documentary material regarding the amount of

           money paid to private counsel to represent any employee of the

           Office of the Attorney General in the Beizer grievance hearing.

 

           p.  Mr. Beizer's entire personnel file excluding his medical records

           and social security number. 

 

           q.  Any and all documentary material regarding any and all

           investigations into Mr. Beizer’s “misconduct” relative to the John

           case, including but not limited to, memos from: Richard

           Blumenthal, Brewster Blackall, Phil Schulz, Bill McCullough,

           Margaret Chapple, Aaron Bayer, and Wil Gundling

 

                      r.  Any and all documentary material regarding any meetings,

                      conversations, dialogue, verbal interactions, e-mail involving all

                      employees, including but not limited to: Richard Blumenthal, Bill

                      McCullough, Brewster Blackall, Phil Schulz, Margaret Chapple,

                     Aaron Bayer, Wil Gundling, and Jane Scholl.

 

           s.  Any and all documentary material regarding all "blue slip”,

           drafts and redrafts relating to Mr. Beizer’s “misconduct” as

           outlined in the Beizer complaint. 

 

           t.  Any and all documentary material regarding all meetings,

           conversations, dialogue, verbal interactions and e-mail involving all

           employees, including but not limited to: Richard Blumenthal, Bill

           McCullough, Brewster Blackall, Phil Schulz, Aaron Bayer, Wil

           Gundling, Jane Scholl, Sharon Scully, Clare Kindall and Charlie

           Overend.

 

           u.  Any and all documentary material from any employee of the

           Office of the Attorney General in regard to communications with

           the Workers Compensation Commission, including but not limited

           to the request for Commissioner Waldron's notes and

           Commissioner Waldron's notes (marked as Exhibit F) at the

           September 14, 2000 Beizer grievance hearing.

 

            4.  It is found that, under cover letter dated September 28, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of over 100 records, some with redactions, which copies were responsive to the request described in paragraphs 3.a., and 3.b., above.  It is also found that, by such letter, the respondents informed the complainant that they were continuing to compile records in response to her request described in paragraph 3, above.  

 

            5.  It is found that, under cover letter dated October 3, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of over 100 records responsive to the request described in paragraphs 3.f, 3.h, 3.i., 3.m, and 3.q., above, and informed the complainant that they were continuing to compile records in response to her request described in paragraph 3, above. 

 

            6.  It is found that, by letter dated October 5, 2000, and filed with the Commission on October 6, 2000, the complainant alleged that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information [hereinafter “FOI”] Act by denying her copies of the records described in paragraph 3, above, excepting “a few documents” responsive to the request described in 3.a., above, which the complainant received by way of the letter described in paragraph 4, above.  The complainant requested an expedited hearing and alleged that the respondents were engaging in the obstruction of justice by denying the request described in paragraph 3, above, since the complainant needed such records for an October, 2000 grievance hearing.  The complainant requested the imposition of civil penalties against the respondents. 

 

            7.  It is found that, to the extent that they exist, the requested records as described in paragraph 3, above, are public records within the meaning of §1-210(a), G.S.

 

            8.   Section §1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained…by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to inspect such records promptly during regular office…hours or to receive a copy of such records… in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212...

 

9.  Section 1-212, G.S., provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record….”

 

            10.  It is found that, under cover letter dated October 10, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of 45 records responsive to the request described in paragraphs 3.a., and 3.o., above, and informed the complainant that they were continuing to compile records in response to her request described in paragraph 3, above. 

 

            11.  It is found that, under cover letter dated October 16, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of 78 records responsive to the request described in paragraphs 3.a., 3.m, and 3.u, above, and informed the complainant that they were continuing to compile records in response to the request described in paragraph 3, above. 

 

            12.  It is found that, under cover letter dated October 26, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of 53 records responsive to the request described in paragraphs 3.b, 3.i., 3.m., and 3.o, above, and informed the complainant that they were continuing to compile records in response to her request described in paragraph 3, above. 

 

13.  It is found that, prior to the hearing in this matter, the hearing officer issued an October 31, 2000 interim order, which contained a finding that the request described in paragraph 3, above, is extremely broad on its face.  By such order, the complainant was ordered to review any records received from the respondents in this matter pursuant to the request described in paragraph 3, above, and to be prepared to specify for the hearing officer any outstanding records not yet received. 

           

            14.  It is found that, by letter dated October 31, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with a list of records which the respondents believed were already in possession of the complainant, and asked her to review the list and notify the respondents of any records which the complainant wished copied, and informed the complainant that such copies would be provided at a discounted cost of ten cents per page.  It is further found that such list encompassed 70 documents under the categories of transcripts, pleadings, correspondence from the Statewide Grievance Committee, letters from Karen Lee Torre, letters from Claire Kindall, letters from Matthew Beizer, and subpoenas. 

 

15.  It is found that the complainant did not respond to the respondent’s letter, described in paragraph 14, above.

 

16.  It is found that, by letter dated October 31, 2000, the respondents informed Mr. Beizer that they had received the request for his personnel file described in paragraph 3.p., above, and that they would be releasing such file, excepting driver’s license number, bank account number, income tax withholding forms and withholding information, information concerning designated retirement beneficiaries, and medical insurance identification number, on the basis of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., and Mr. Beizer’s evaluations, on the basis of §5-237, G.S.  It is further found that, on November 1, 2000, Mr. Beizer filed with the respondents a written objection to the disclosure of records in his personnel file indicating driver’s license number, bank account number, income tax withholding forms and withholding information, information concerning designated retirement beneficiaries, and medical insurance identification number. 

 

            17.  It is found that, under cover letter dated November 6, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of Mr. Beizer’s personnel file as requested in paragraph 3.p., above, excepting driver’s license number, bank account number, income tax withholding forms and withholding information, information concerning designated retirement beneficiaries, medical insurance identification number, and evaluations. 

 

            18.  It is found that, by letter dated November 14, 2000 to the respondents, and in furtherance of the interim order described in paragraph 13, above, the complainant withdrew the request described in paragraph 3.t, above.  Accordingly, it is concluded that the complaint herein does not encompass the alleged denial of such request.

 

            19.  It is also found that, by the letter described in paragraph 18, above, the complainant modified the request described in paragraph 3.s, to read as follows: “[a]ny and all documentary material regarding blue slips, blue slip drafts, all meetings, conversations, dialogue, verbal interactions, e-mail involving all employees who had anything to do with [the complainant’s] worker’s compensation claim, the [Beizer complaint] and the [Beizer grievance.]  These employees include but are not limited to: Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Bill McCullough, Brewster Blackall, Phil Schulz, Margaret Chapple, Aaron Bayer, Wil Gundling, Sharon Scully, Clare Kindall, Charlie Overend, and Jane Scholl.”  Accordingly, it is concluded that the complaint herein encompasses the request initially described in paragraph 3.s, above, as so modified. 

 

            20.  It is also found that, by the letter described in paragraph 18, above, the complainant modified the request described in paragraph 3.u, to read as follows:

“[a]ny and all documentary material from any employee of the office of the attorney general to the workers compensation commission relating to [the John case].  These include but are not limited to the request for Commissioner Waldron's notes and Commissioner Waldron's notes (marked as Exhibit F) at the September 14, 2000 Beizer grievance hearing.”  Accordingly, it is concluded that the complaint herein encompasses the request initially described in paragraph 3.u, above, as so modified. 

 

            21.  It is also found that, by the letter described in paragraph 18, above, the complainant requested that the respondents notify her which records already produced corresponded to her initial request and to list any records not yet produced.  It is found that the respondent did not specifically respond to such request.

 

22.  It is found that, by letter dated November 20, 2000, the respondents provided the complainant with a list of records which the respondents believed were already in possession of the complainant, and asked her to review the list and notify the respondents of any records which the complainant wished copied, and informed the complainant that such copies would be provided at a discounted cost of ten cents per page.  It is further found that such list encompassed 54 documents and included letters from Mr. Cipriano and letters from Mr. Beizer.  It is found that the complainant did not specifically respond to such request.

 

            23.  It is found that, at the hearing in this matter, the respondents provided the complainant with copies of 86 records responsive to the requests described in paragraphs 3.a., 3.f., 3.h, 3.i., 3.l., 3.o., 3.s., and 3.u, above. 

 

            24.  At the hearing in this matter, the complainant acknowledged that she had been provided with some records but contended that she had not been provided with all requested records.  The respondents, on the other hand, contended that they had provided the complainant with all requested records which they keep on file or maintain which are responsive to the request described in paragraph 3, above, with the exception of records provided to the Commission for in-camera inspection, as described in paragraph 27, below.

 

25.  It is found that the respondents provided the complainant with copies of all records requested in paragraph 3, above, and as modified in paragraphs 18, 19, and 20, above, which they keep on file or maintain, within the meaning of §1-210(a), G.S., excepting those records provided to the Commission for in-camera inspection, as described in paragraph 27, below. 

 

            26.  By motions filed December 4, 2000, the complainant moved to strike all testimony presented after her departure from the November 27, 2000 hearing, and moved that the undersigned hearing officer recuse herself from this matter.  The complainant contended that the denial of her request for continuance was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, and that the hearing officer displayed partiality to the respondents.  The undersigned hearing officer denied such motions in writing on December 13, 2000. 

 

            27.  The respondents submitted for in-camera review copies of all requested records for which they claim exemption.  For identification purposes, the in-camera documents have been designated IC2000-557-1 through IC2000-557-157.

 

            28.  The respondents contend that redacted portions of IC2000-557-17 and IC2000-557-1-26 through IC2000-557-31, are exempt by virtue of §12-15(a), G.S.  Such statute provides in relevant part that: 

 

[n]o officer or employee, including any former officer or former employee, of the state or of any other person who has or had access to returns or return information…shall disclose or inspect any return or return information….

 

29.  Section 12-15(h), G.S., defines “return information” as:

 

…a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of the taxpayer's income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax collected or withheld, tax underreportings, tax overreportings, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subjected to other investigation or processing, or any other data received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the commissioner with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability of any person for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense….

           

30.  Upon careful review of the redacted portions of IC2000-557-17, and IC2000-557-1-26 through IC2000-557-31, it is found that such records constitute “return or return information” within the meaning of §12-15(a), G.S.  Accordingly, it is concluded that such records are exempt from mandatory disclosure and that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they denied the complainant copies of such records. 

 

31.  The respondents contend that IC2000-557-32 through IC2000-557-36, identified in the in-camera index as performance appraisals, are exempt by virtue of §5-237, G.S. 

 

32.  Pursuant to §5-237, G.S., “[A]ny employee … shall have the right, at reasonable times during office hours, to inspect his service ratings, as shown in the records of the Department of Administrative Services or of the department, agency or institution in which such employee is employed.”  [Emphasis added.]

 

33.  Section 5-237, G.S., as interpreted by the court in Personnel Director v. FOIC, 214 Conn. 312 (1990), permits inspection of an employee’s service rating by such individual employee only.

 

34.  It is found that in-camera documents IC-557-32 through IC-557-36 are “service ratings” within the meaning of §5-237, G.S., and it is therefore concluded that such records are exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of such statue.  It is further concluded that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they denied the complainant copies of such records. 

 

35.  The respondents contend that IC2000-557-37, identified as the job application of Mr. Beizer, is exempt by virtue of §5-225, G.S. 

 

36.  Section 5-225, G.S., provides in relevant part that:

 

      [a]ll persons competing in any examination shall be given written notice of their final earned ratings and the minimum earned rating necessary to pass the examination.  Within thirty days of receipt of the final earned rating, a person may inspect his papers, markings, background profiles and other items used in determining the final earned ratings, other than examination questions and other materials constituting the examination, subject to such regulations as may be issued by the Commissioner of Administrative Services . . . .”

 

37.  Section 5-225, G.S., as interpreted by the court in Personnel Director v. FOIC, 214 Conn. 312 (1990), permits inspection of a state employee’s application by the such individual employee only.  It is therefore concluded that in-camera document  IC2000-557-37 is exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of §5-225, G.S., and it is also concluded that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they denied the complainant copies of such record. 

 

38.  The respondents contend that portions of IC2000-557-38 through IC2000-557-42, consisting of Mr. Beizer’s driver’s license number, bank account number, information concerning designated retirement beneficiaries, and medical insurance identification number, are exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of §1-210(b)(2), G.S. 

 

            39.  Section 1-210(b)(2), G.S., permits the nondisclosure of “personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy.”

 

40.  Pursuant to Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158 (1993), the appropriate test when examining a claim of exemption pursuant to §1-210(b)(2), G.S., is (1) the information sought must constitute “personnel or medical files and similar files” and (2) the following additional elements must be met: the information sought does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and such information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.

 

41.  Upon careful review of the records described in paragraph 38, above, it is found that such records constitute “personnel files” within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2).  It is further found that such records do not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and that release of such records would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. 

 

42.  It is therefore concluded that the records described in paragraph 38, above, are exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of §1-210(b), G.S., and that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., when they denied the complainant copies of such records.

 

43.  The respondents contend that the following records are exempt from disclosure by virtue of Public Act No. 99-179, now codified at §§51-87a(b) and 52-146r, G.S.:  IC2000-557-1, IC2000-557-2, IC2000-557-4 through IC2000-557-16, IC2000-557-18 through IC2000-557-25, IC2000-557-43 through IC2000-557-79, IC2000-557-81, IC2000-557-83 through IC2000-557-93, and IC2000-557-95 through IC2000-557-157

 

44.  Section 52-146r, G.S., is the relevant section upon which the respondents base their claim of exemption.  Section 52-146r(b), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

“[i]n any civil or criminal case or proceeding or in any legislative or administrative proceeding, all confidential communications shall be privileged and a government attorney shall not disclose any such communications unless an authorized representative of the public agency consents to waive the privilege and allow such disclosure.”

 

            45.  Section 52-146r(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

“(2)….Confidential communications means all oral and written communications transmitted in confidence between a public official or employee of a public agency acting in the performance of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment and a government attorney relating to legal advice sought by the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency from that attorney, and all records prepared by the government attorney in furtherance of the rendition of such legal advice….(3)Government attorney means a person admitted to the bar of this state and employed by a public agency or retained by a public agency or public official to provide legal advice to the public agency or a public official or employee of such public agency….”

 

            46.  It is found that Mr. Beizer is a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(a), G.S., and a government attorney within the meaning of §52-146r(a)(3), G.S.  It is also found that outside counsel hired by respondent office to represent Mr. Beizer in the Beizer grievance is a government attorney, within the meaning §52-146r(a)(3), G.S. 

 

            47.  It is found that Berkley and Alexis are companies retained by the state of Connecticut as its agents for purposes of reviewing workers’ compensation claims filed by state employees. 

 

48.  It is found that the John case is a civil case or proceeding, and that the Beizer grievance is an administrative proceeding, within the meaning of §52-146r(b), G.S. 

 

            49.  It is found that the following in-camera documents consist of letters, memorandums, e-mails, and other records regarding the Beizer grievance and the John case, constituting confidential communications within the meaning of §52-146r, G.S., and are therefore exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of §52-146r, G.S.:  IC2000-557-1, IC2000-557-2, IC2000-557-4 through IC2000-557-14, IC2000-557-18 through IC2000-557-25, IC2000-557-43 through IC2000-557-79, IC2000-557-81, IC2000-557-83 through IC2000-557-93, IC2000-557-95, IC2000-557-97 through IC2000-557-101, IC2000-557-104-153, and IC2000-557-155 through IC2000-557-157. 

 

50.  It is concluded, therefore, that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by denying the complainant copies of the records described in paragraph 49, above. 

 

51.  The respondents also contend that records IC2000-557-3, IC-2000-557-94, IC-2000-557-102, IC-2000-557-103, and redacted portions of IC2000-557-15 and IC2000-557-16, are exempt from mandatory disclosure by virtue of  §1-210(b)(10), G.S., as attorney-client privileged communications:

 

52.  Section 1-210(b)(10), G.S., provides in relevant part that nothing in the FOI Act shall be construed to require disclosure of “communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship . . . .”

 

            53.  The exemption for attorney-client privileged communications contained in §1-210(b)(10), G.S., is limited to the following circumstances in accordance with established Connecticut law:

 

“Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection may be waived.”  Lafaive v. Diloreto, 2 Conn. App. 58, 65 (1984), cert. denied 194 Conn. 801 (1984).

 

            54.  The attorney-client privilege protects communications between client and attorney, when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice.  Ullmann v. State, 240 Conn. 698, 711 (1994).  The privilege is waived when statements of the communications are made to third parties. Id. at 711; see LaFaive v. DiLoreto, supra.

 

            55.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149, 159 (1998), ruled that communications to an attorney for a public agency are protected from disclosure by the privilege if the following conditions are met: 1) the attorney must be acting in a professional capacity for the agency, (2) the communications must be made to the attorney by current employees or officials of the agency, (3) the communications must relate to the legal advice sought by the agency from the attorney, and (4) the communications must be made in confidence.

 

            56.  Upon careful review of IC2000-557-3 and IC-2000-557-94, it is found that such records constitute communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship within the meaning of §1-210(b)(10), G.S.  Accordingly, it is concluded that such records are exempt from mandatory disclosure and that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by denying the complainant copies of such records. 

           

            57.  It is also found, however, that IC-2000-557-102, IC-2000-557-103, and redacted portions of IC2000-557-15 and IC-2000-557-16, are not confidential communications within the meaning of §52-146r(a)(2), G.S., or communications privileged by the attorney-client relationship, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(10), G.S. 

 

58.  The respondents also contend that the records described in paragraph 57, above, as well as IC-2000-557-80 and IC-2000-557-82, are exempt from disclosure by virtue §1-210(b)(4), G.S. 

 

            59.  Section §1-210(b)(4), G.S., permits the non-disclosure of “records pertaining to strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency is a party until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled. . . .”

 

60.  It is found that the John case and the Beizer grievance constitute pending claims or pending litigation and that neither has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled, within the meaning of §1-210(b)(4), G.S. 

 

61.  Upon careful review of IC2000-557-80 and IC2000-557-82, it is found that such records are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S.  It is therefore concluded that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by denying the complainant copies of such records. 

 

62.  Upon careful review of IC2000-557-15, it is found that all redacted portions are exempt by virtue §1-210(b)(4), G.S., excepting page 1, entries 1 and 7-9; page 2, entries 1-3 and 6-7; page 3, entries 2, 5, and 8; and page 4, entry 2.  Upon careful review of IC2000-557-16, it is found that all redacted portions are exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-210(b)(4), G.S., excepting page 1, entry 2; and page 2, entry 8.

 

63.  Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by denying the complainant copies of the redacted portions of IC-2000-557-15, and 2000-557-16, excepting those entries described in paragraph 62, above. 

 

64.  Upon careful review of IC2000-557-102 and IC2000-557-103, it is found that such records are not exempt by virtue §1-210(b)(4), G.S.  Accordingly, it is concluded that such records are subject to mandatory disclosure pursuant to §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.

 

65.  The respondents contend that §52-146r, G.S., the attorney-client privilege, and §1-210(b)(4), G.S., all operate to exempt IC2000-557-154.  However, upon careful review, it is found that such record is not exempt.  Accordingly, it is concluded that such record is subject to mandatory disclosure pursuant to §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.  

 

66.  It is concluded that the respondents violated §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S., by denying the complainant copies of IC-2000-557-15 and IC-2000-557-16, including the entries previously redacted which are specified in paragraph 62 of the findings, above, as well as copies of IC-2000-557-102, IC-2000-557-103, and IC-2000-557-154.  

 

67.  The respondents did not provide the Commission with a copy of IC2000-557-96; however, it is noted that the in-camera index in this matter indicates that such record has been provided to the complainant through the discovery process in connection with the Beizer grievance.  Accordingly, such record shall not be considered herein.

 

            68.  It is concluded that civil penalties are not warranted in this matter.

 

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint.

 

1.  Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the disclosure provisions of §§1-210(a) and 1-212(a), G.S.  

 

2.  Forthwith, the respondents shall provide the complainant with copies of IC-2000-557-15 and IC-2000-557-16, including the entries previously redacted which are specified in paragraph 62 of the findings, above, as well as copies of IC-2000-557-102, IC-2000-557-103, and IC-2000-557-154.

 

            3.  Despite the conclusion set forth in paragraph 66 of the findings, above, the respondents are commended for their efforts to comply with the request described in paragraph 3 of the findings, above.  

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of June 13, 2001.

 

 

_________________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission


PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Wendy John

19 Richard Lane

Bloomfield, CT 06002

 

Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General,

State of Connecticut, Office of the Attorney

General; Wil Gundling, William McCullough,

Phillip Schulz, Margaret Chapple, Assistant

Attorneys General, State of Connecticut,

Office of the Attorney General; and State of

Connecticut, Office of the Attorney General

c/o Maria C. Rodriguez, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

PO Box 120, 55 Elm Street

Hartford, CT 06141-0120 and

Carla R. Walworth, Esq.

Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP

1055 Washington Boulevard, 10th floor

Stamford, CT 06901

 

 

 

________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2000-557/FD/paj/06/18/2001