FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
| In the Matter of a Complaint by | FINAL DECISION | ||
| Joseph Mincewicz, | |||
| Complainants | |||
| against | Docket #FIC 2001-425 | ||
|
Commissioner, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police; and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police, |
|||
| Respondent | August 28, 2002 | ||
The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on February 11, 2002, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1. The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.
2. It is found that by letter dated August 18, 2001, the complainant made a request to the respondents for a copy of “any and all documents relating to internal police department investigations of Sergeant Maurice C. Parker # 103 employee #378558” (hereinafter “IA report”).
3. It is found that by letter dated August 21, 2001, the respondents informed the complainant that Sergeant Parker objected to the disclosure of the IA report and enclosed a copy of Sergeant Parker’s written objection.
4. By letter dated September 1, 2001, and filed on September 12, 2001, the complainant appealed to this Commission alleging that the respondents violated the Freedom of Information (‘FOI”) Act by denying his request.
5. Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right . . . to receive a copy of such records in accordance with the provisions of section 1-212. Any agency rule or regulation, or part thereof, that conflicts with the provisions of this subsection or diminishes or curtails in any way the rights granted by this subsection shall be void.
6. Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record . . . .”
7. It is found that the IA report is a public record within the meaning of §1-210(a), G.S.
8. The respondents contend that the IA report constitutes a personnel or similar file within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., and that disclosure of the report would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The respondents argued that disclosure would constitute an invasion of Sergeant Parker’s personal privacy because the IA report was a result of an investigation of an off-duty incident that did not pertain to his position as a Connecticut State Trooper. The respondents also contend that the privacy interest of Sergeant Parker outweighs the public interest in disclosure because the matter was purely personal.
9. Section 1-210(b)(2), G.S., provides in relevant part that nothing in the FOI Act shall require disclosure of “. . . personnel or medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal privacy . . .”
10. The Commission takes administrative notice of the final decision in contested
case docket #FIC 2001-251; Fred Radford v. Chief, Police Department, Town of
Trumbull (January 2002), with respect to the discussion of §1-210(b)(2), G.S., and
Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158 (1993).
11. In Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158, 175 (1993), the Supreme Court set forth the test for the exemption contained in §1-210(b)(2), G.S. The claimant must first establish that the files in question are personnel, medical or similar files. Second, the claimant must show that disclosure of the records would constitute an invasion of personal privacy. In determining whether disclosure would constitute an invasion of personal privacy, the claimant must establish both of two elements: first, that the information sought does not pertain to legitimate matters of public concern, and second, that such information is highly offensive to a reasonable person.
12. It is found that an incident took place at Sergeant Parker’s home and certain allegations regarding the incident came to the respondents’ attention that caused the respondents to conduct an internal affairs investigation.
13. It is also found that the investigation resulted in the IA report, which contains a recommendation that Sergeant Parker seek counseling, but no official action was taken by the respondents regarding the matter.
14. It is further found that the IA report constitutes “personnel” or “similar” file within the meaning of §1-210(b)(2), G.S.
15. While it is not clear why the respondents would expend state resources to conduct an investigation regarding a matter that was purely personal, it is found that the contents of the IA report do not pertain to the conduct of the public’s business because the matter investigated pertained to Sergeant Parker’s family and home life, and did not relate to, or directly affect Sergeant Parker’s employment as a State Trooper.
16. It is therefore found that the contents of the IA report do not pertain to a legitimate matter of public concern.
17. It is further found that disclosure of the IA report would disclose intimate information about Sergeant Parker, members of his family and his home life and that disclosure of such information would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
18. At the hearing on this matter the complainant pointed out that Sergeant Parker’s letter of objection was dated August 3, 2001. The complainant claimed that because he had made similar requests regarding other officers, the respondents suspected that he was going to make his August 11, 2001 request and allowed Sergeant Parker to object to the disclosure of the IA report before he actually submitted his request. The complainant argued that the premature objection to the disclosure of the IA report demonstrates that the respondents manipulated the situation to deny the complainant’s request and did so without reasonable grounds.
19. It is found, however, that the letter of denial is a form letter, which the respondent department issues, as a standard practice, to an employee when the respondent department receives a request for that employee’s personnel records.
20. It is also found that the respondents failed to edit the form letter to reflect the correct date before printing it from a computer and giving it to Sergeant Parker.
21. Based on the forgoing, it is concluded that the respondents did not violate the disclosure provisions of §1-210(a), G.S., by denying the complainant’s request.
The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint.
1. The complaint is hereby dismissed.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of August 28, 2002.
_______________________________________
Petrea A. Jones
Acting Clerk of the Commission
PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Joseph Mincewicz
c/o Irene Alwill
395 Chase Avenue
Waterbury, CT 06704
Commissioner, State of Connecticut,
Department of Public Safety, Division
of State Police; and State of Connecticut,
Department of Public Safety, Division of
State Police
c/o Matthew B. Beizer, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
110 Sherman Street, MacKenzie Hall
Hartford, CT 06105-2294
________________________________
Petrea A. Jones
Acting Clerk of the Commission
FIC/2001-425/FD/paj/9/3/2002