FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by

FINAL DECISION

Marvin P. Zimmerman and

Jon Grossman,

 

Complainants

 

 

against

Docket #FIC 2003-133

Chairman, Board of Assessment Appeals,

Town of Branford; and Board of

Assessment Appeals, Town of Branford,

 

 

Respondents

September 10, 2003

 

 

 

 

            The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on July 24, 2003, at which time the complainants and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.  For purposes of hearing, this matter was consolidated with Docket #FIC 2003-153, Stacy S. Ruwe against Joe Chandler, Chairman, Board of Assessment Appeals, Town of Branford; Peter Banca, Erica Campbell, Chris Peterson and Michael Milici, as members, Board of Assessment Appeals, Town of Branford; and Board of Assessment Appeals, Town of Branford (hereinafter Docket #FIC 2003-153).

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

1.      The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

            2.  By letter dated April 7, 2003 and filed April 9, 2003, the complainants appealed to the Commission, alleging that at the respondent board’s March 23, 2003 meeting, the respondent chairman directed members of the public to leave the room, while the respondents deliberated on property assessment appeals, in violation of the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act. 

 

            3.  At the hearing on this matter, the complainants indicated that they had misstated the date of the respondent board’s meeting in their letter of complaint and that the reference to March 23, 2003, should have been to March 24, 2003.  The complainants also clarified that the respondent chairman did not direct people to leave the room; rather, the respondents left the room and conducted their meeting in a separate, private room.

 

            4.  It is found that the Town of Branford hired a private company to conduct a property revaluation for the town and that the company completed its property assessments in the Fall of 2002.  It is also found that property owners who wished to have their assessment reviewed by the respondent board filed appeal applications with the board and then had an opportunity to meet with an individual member of the respondent board.  Thereafter, the member of the respondent board who met with the property owner was responsible for presenting his or her version of the appeal to the respondent board as a whole for its consideration.

 

            5.  It is found that the respondents held a meeting on March 24, 2003, for the purpose of reviewing and voting on all appeal applications for “2002 Grand Lists of Real Estate, Personal Property and the 2001 Supplemental Motor Vehicle”.  The respondents recessed the March 24, 2003 meeting late in the evening, to March 25, 2003 and then again to March 26, 2003 (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the March meetings”), in order to complete the respondents’ business, which they were required by statute to conclude by the end of March. 

 

            6.  It is found that at the commencement of the March 24, 2003 meeting, the respondents convened an executive session.  The meeting minutes state the purpose of the executive session as follows:  “to discuss properties with possible litigation.”  On each of the evenings that the respondent board met, it convened in public session, moved into executive session, reconvened in public session following the executive session, and then voted on various appeals without any discussion.

 

            7.  It is found that in advance of the March meetings, Stacy Ruwe, the complainant in Docket #FIC 2003-153, had arranged to have the proceedings of the March meetings videotaped.

 

            8.  It is found that the complainants in this case and Ms. Ruwe in Docket #FIC 2003-153, had each filed appeal applications with the respondent board, that were considered and voted on at the March meetings.  It is also found that although neither the complainants in this case nor Ms. Ruwe attended the March meetings of the respondent board, they had anticipated that they would be able to review the videotapes of the proceedings and deliberations of the respondent board, prior to making a determination as to whether they would appeal the respondent board’s decisions, if adverse to them, to Superior Court.  However, they were not able to do so due to the fact that the deliberations were conducted in executive session and no videotapes were therefore made of the deliberations.

 

9.  Section 1-225(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that “the meetings of all public agencies, except executive sessions, as defined in subdivision (6) of section 1-200, shall be open to the public.” 

 

10.  Section 1-200(6)(B), G.S., permits a public agency to convene in executive session for:

 

strategy and negotiations with respect to pending claims or pending litigation to which the public agency or a member thereof, because of the member’s conduct as a member of such agency, is a party until such litigation or claim has been finally adjudicated or otherwise settled.

 

11.  Section 1-200(8), G.S., defines a pending claim as:

 

a written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action in an appropriate forum if such relief or right is not granted.

 

            12.  Section 1-200(9), G.S., defines pending litigation as:

 

(A)  a written notice to an agency which sets forth a demand for legal relief or which asserts a legal right stating the intention to institute an action before a court if such relief or right is not granted by the agency;  (B)  the service of a complaint against an agency returnable to a court which seeks to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right;  or (C)  the agency's consideration of action to enforce or implement legal relief or a legal right.

 

            13.  At the hearing on this matter, the respondents maintained that they had been advised by counsel that it would be appropriate to convene in executive session to consider the assessment appeals.  The respondents’ counsel stated at the hearing on this matter that the basis for her advice was that such appeals constituted “pending claims” and that the respondents’ discussion of them constituted “strategy” and “negotiations” with respect to such claims within the meaning of §1-200(6) (B), G.S.  

 

            14.  The reasoning offered by the respondents’counsel at the hearing on this matter is different from the reason proffered by the respondents in the minutes of the March meetings.  The minutes indicate that the respondents viewed the possibility that each appeal to the respondent board could lead to litigation in Superior Court as “pending litigation” that justified convening in executive session.  It is found that the possibility that a decision made by the respondent board could be appealed to Superior Court does not constitute “pending litigation” within the meaning of  §1-200(9), G.S.

 

            15.    With respect to the reasoning offered by the respondents’ counsel at the hearing on this matter, described in paragraph 13, above, it is found that the respondent board is an adjudicatory body, whose responsibility is to review appeals, deliberate and ultimately determine, based upon fair market value, whether an individual’s property assessment should be modified.  An appeal to the respondent board merely seeks such a review, deliberation and determination by the respondent board; it does not set forth a demand for legal relief or assert a legal right stating the intention to institute an action in an appropriate forum if such relief is not granted.  Thus, appeals brought to the respondent board do not constitute “pending claims” within the meaning of §1-200(8), G.S. 

 

            16.  Further, even if the possibility of an appeal to Superior Court could be construed as “pending litigation” within the meaning of §1-200(9), G.S., or the appeals filed with the respondent board could be construed as “pending claims” within the meaning of §1-200(8), G.S., the respondents are not “parties” to the claims themselves.  Rather, they are impartial decision makers, as described in paragraph 15, above.

 

            17.  Moreover, even if the possibility of an appeal to Superior Court could be construed as “pending litigation” within the meaning of §1-200(9), G.S., or the appeals filed with the respondent board could be construed as “pending claims” within the meaning of §1-200(8), G.S., the review and deliberations of the members of the respondent board could not possibly be deemed to be “strategy” or “negotiations” within the meaning of §1-200(6)(B), G.S.

 

            18.  The respondents further stated at the hearing on this matter that their “privacy” concerns led them to convene in executive session because some of the information that individuals put on the appeal application forms is personal in nature and the respondents felt uncomfortable discussing such matters in public and before video cameras.

 

            19.  It is found that the “privacy” concerns referenced by the respondents do not constitute a valid basis for an executive session. 

 

            20.  It is concluded that the respondents did not convene in executive session during the March meetings for a proper purpose pursuant to §1-206, G.S., and that they therefore violated the open meeting provisions of §1-225(a), G.S.

 

            21.  In their letter of complaint, the complainants requested that the Commission require the respondents to start their process again, from the time the private company that conducted the revaluation mailed out assessment notices to the individual property owners.  However, at the hearing in this matter, the complainants withdrew their request, based upon the hardship and cost that would be imposed upon the Town of Branford.   The Commission therefore declines to impose the remedy originally requested in this case.

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the open meeting requirements of §1-225(a), G.S., in the conduct of their hearings and meetings with respect to property assessment appeals.

 

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of September 10, 2003.

 

 

___________________________________

Ann B. Gimmartino

Acting Clerk of the Commission


PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Marvin P. Zimmerman

23 Prospect Hill Road

Branford, CT  06405-5711

 

Jon Grossman

11 Prospect Hill Road

Branford, CT  06405-5711

 

Chairman, Board of Assessment Appeals,

Town of Branford; and Board of Assessment

Appeals, Town of Branford

c/o Carolyn Vacchiano, Esq.

Wiggin & Dana LLP

One Century Tower, PO Box 1832

New Haven, CT  06508-1832

 

 

___________________________________

Ann B. Gimmartino

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2003-133FD/abg/09/12/2003