FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

           

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on July 8, 2005, at which time the complainant and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint. 

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

2.  By letter of complaint filed February 2, 2005, the complainant appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act by failing to notice its January 31, 2005 meeting twenty-four hours in advance of the meeting, and by failing to deliver written notice of the meeting to all members of the respondent.

 

3.  It is found that the respondent held a special meeting at 6:30 p.m. on Monday, January 31, 2005.

 

4.  It is found that the complainant is a member of the respondent, and that he attended the January 31, 2005 meeting.

 

5.  It is found that the respondent filed the notice of its January 31, 2005 meeting with the Winchester town clerk at 11:19 a.m. on Friday, January 28, 2005, and that the town clerk posted the notice before noon in the office on that day.

 

6.  It is found that the respondent notified its members, including the complainant, of the January 31, 2005 meeting by telephone. 

 

7.  It is found that, at the meeting, the respondent convened in executive session to discuss the employment of the superintendent of schools.

 

8.  The complainant contends that the respondent failed to give notice of its January 31, 2005 meeting twenty-four hours prior to the meeting, because the office of the town clerk was closed on the afternoon of January 28, 2005, shortly after the notice was filed and posted.

 

9.  The complainant also contends that the respondent failed to give written notice to each member of the respondent, as required by §1-225(d), G.S.

 

10.  Section 1-225(d), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

    Notice of each special meeting of every public agency …  shall be given not less than twenty-four hours prior to the time of such meeting by filing a notice of the time and place thereof …  in the office of the clerk of such subdivision for any public agency of a political subdivision of the state ….  The secretary or clerk shall cause any notice received under this section to be posted in his office.  …  In addition, such written notice shall be delivered to the usual place of abode of each member of the public agency so that the same is received prior to such special meeting. …  The requirement of delivery of such written notice may also be dispensed with as to any member who is actually present at the meeting at the time it convenes. 

 

11.  Section 1-225(g), G.S., provides:

 

   In determining the time within which or by when a notice, agenda, record of votes or minutes of a special meeting or an emergency special meeting are required to be filed under this section, Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays and any day on which the office of the agency, the Secretary of the State or the clerk of the applicable political subdivision or the clerk of each municipal member of any multitown district or agency, as the case may be, is closed, shall be excluded.

 

12.  The complainant appears to argue that, since the office of the town clerk was closed on Friday afternoon, January 28, that day is excluded in its entirety for purposes of determining the time within which the notice is required to be filed, pursuant to §1-225(g), G.S.  Therefore, the complainant contends, the twenty-four hour notice period did not begin until the office opened on the following Monday morning, January 31, 2005.

 

13.  It is concluded, however, that §1-225(g), G.S., is more reasonably interpreted to exclude only the portion of regular office hours that the office of the agency is closed; in this case, that is, from noon until 5:00 p.m. on Friday, January 28, 2005.  Therefore, the twenty-four notice period began at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, January 28, 2005.

 

14.  The Commission observes that, had the notice hypothetically been posted at 4:59 p.m. on Friday, January 28, and the office had then closed at 5:00 p.m. on the same day, the notice period would have begun at 5:00 p.m. on Friday and ended, excluding the weekend, at 5:00 p.m. on Monday, January 31, 2005.  In such a case, the public would have had precisely the same amount of notice as it was given in this case, when the notice was posted shortly before noon when the office closed on January 28, 2005.  Consequently, commencing the notice period at the ordinary close of business, 5:00 p.m. in this case, produces a reasonable, fair and consistent result.

 

15.  The Commission also concludes that the twenty-four notice requirement contained in §1-225(d), G.S.,  generally has the effect of ensuring that a notice of a special meeting is posted in a town clerk’s office for at least a twenty-four hour period that includes at least one full business day, and that these conditions were satisfied by the notice in this case. 

 

16.  It is also concluded that such a result is consistent with prior decisions of the Commission.  In Docket #FIC 92-363, Alphonse Avitabile et al. v. Bethlehem Board of Selectmen, the Commission concluded, under circumstances similar to this case, that a notice, filed at 10:00 a.m. on a Friday on which the clerk’s office closed at 1:00 p.m., was filed at least twenty-four hours before a meeting held at 7:30 p.m. on the following Monday.

 

17.  It is concluded that the respondent did not violate §1-225(d), G.S., with respect to the filing of its notice of meeting.

 

18.  With respect to the complainant’s allegation that he did not, as a member of the respondent, receive written notice of the meeting pursuant to §1-225(d), G.S., it is concluded that the statute plainly provides that the requirement of written notice may be dispensed with as to any member who was actually present, as the complainant was.

 

19.  With respect to the complainant’s allegation that other members of the respondent did not receive written notice of the meeting pursuant to §1-225(d), G.S.,  it is concluded that the complainant lacks standing to complain about lack of notice to other members.  See Richard Rutkowski v. Mayor, Town of Berlin et al., Docket #FIC 1998-060; Anne Grabowy v. Chairman, Board of Finance, Town of Lisbon, Docket #FIC 1997-369; John D. Candelmo v. Oxford Board of Finance, Docket #FIC 90-1.

 

20.  It is concluded that the respondent did not violate §1-225(d), G.S., with respect to the requirement of written notice to its members.  

 

 

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

1.      The complaint is dismissed.

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of January 25, 2006.

 

________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

David LaPointe

11 Hillside Avenue

Winchester, CT 06098

 

Board of Education,

Winchester Public Schools

c/o Victor Schoen, Esq.

646 Prospect Avenue

Hartford, CT 06001

 

 

 

___________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

FIC/2005-042FD/paj/1/26/2006