FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

           

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on July 20, 2005, at which time the complainants and the respondent appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.   For purposes of hearing, this case was consolidated with Docket #FIC 2005-156; Ken Byron and The Hartford Courant v. Consolidation Committee, Enfield Fire Chiefs Association and Docket #FIC 2005-164; Ralph Williams and the Manchester Journal Inquirer v. Consolidation Committee, Enfield Fire Chiefs Association.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  It is found that, by letter dated April 15, 2005, the complainants requested that the respondent provide them with copies of public notices and minutes of the respondent’s meetings from April 2004 through April 2005, as well as the respondent’s 2004-2005 budget. 

 

2.  By letter dated and filed with the Commission on May 6, 2005, the complainants alleged that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information  [hereinafter “FOI”] Act by not providing them with copies of the records described in paragraph 1, above. 

 

3.  Section 1-210(a), G.S., provides in relevant part:

 

[e]xcept as otherwise provided by any federal law or state statute, all records maintained or kept on file by any public agency, whether or not such records are required by any law or by any rule or regulation, shall be public records and every person shall have the right to…receive a copy of such records in accordance with section 1-212….

 

4.  Section 1-212(a), G.S., provides in relevant part: “[a]ny person applying in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of any public record.” 

 

5.  The respondent contends that it is not a “public agency” within the meaning of the FOI Act. 

 

6.   Section 1-200(1), G.S., defines “public agency” to mean:

 

“…(A) [a]ny executive, administrative or legislative office of the state or any political subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official of the state or of any city, town, borough, municipal corporation, school district, regional district or other district or other political subdivision of the state, including any committee of, or created by, any such office, subdivision, agency, department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official, and also includes any judicial office, official, or body or committee thereof but only with respect to its or their administrative functions; (B) Any person to the extent such person is deemed to be the functional equivalent of a public agency pursuant to law; or (C) Any “implementing agency,” as defined in section 32-222.”

 

7.   It is found that the town of Enfield has within it five separate fire districts [hereinafter “the districts”], which are independently run by five boards of elected fire commissioners [hereinafter “the boards”]. 

 

            8.  It is found that the respondent is a voluntary organization consisting of district chiefs, assistant chiefs, deputy chiefs and battalion chiefs from all five districts.   

 

9.  With respect to §1-200(1)(A), G.S., it is found that the respondent is not an executive, administrative or legislative office of Enfield, nor is it an Enfield agency, department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official.   Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondent is not a  “public agency”, within the meaning of §1-200(1)(A), G.S.  

 

10.   With respect to §1-200(1)(C), G.S., §32-222, G.S., defines “implementing agency to mean “…(1) [a]n economic development commission, redevelopment agency; sewer authority or sewer commission; public works commission; water authority or water commission; port authority or port commission or harbor authority or harbor commission; parking authority or parking commission; (2) a nonprofit development corporation; or (3) any other agency designated and authorized by a municipality to undertake a project.…”

 

11.  It is concluded that the respondent is not an “implementing agency”, within the meaning of §1-200(1)(C), G.S.  

 

12.  With respect to whether the respondent is deemed to be the “functional equivalent” of a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1)(B), G.S., the Supreme Court has adopted a “functional equivalent” test to determine whether an entity is a public agency.   Board of Trustees of Woodstock Academy v. FOI Commission, 181 Conn. 544, 554 (1980) (“Woodstock”).  Such test consists of the following four criteria: (1) whether the entity performs a governmental function; (2) the level of government funding; (3) the extent of government involvement or regulation; and (4) whether the entity was created by government.

 

            13.  Subsequently, in Connecticut Humane Society v. FOI Commission, 281 Conn. 757, 761 (1991), the Supreme Court elaborated that all four factors set forth in Woodstock are not necessary for a finding of functional equivalence, but rather that “all relevant factors are to be considered cumulatively, with no single factor being essential or conclusive.”

 

            14.  With respect to the first criterion, it is found that the purpose of the respondent is to promote, administer, and educate the public within the town of Enfield in all phases of fire emergency service operations.  It is further found that there is no requirement for the respondent to provide such services to Enfield.  It is also found that the respondent has a fraternal aspect in that its members engage in social gatherings.    It is found that the respondent does not provide fire response services to the town of Enfield; rather, the districts provide such services.    It is concluded that the respondent does not presently perform a governmental function.

 

15.  With respect to the second criterion, it is found that the respondent derives its revenues from fees for educational services provided to, and paid for by, the districts, in addition to grants and charitable contributions.  It is also found that the Internal Revenue Service has deemed the respondent a 501(c)(3) organization.  It is concluded that the respondent receives a majority of its funds from government. 

 

16.  With respect to the third criterion, it is found that neither the districts nor the boards regulate the respondent or are involved in the respondent.  It is concluded that the third criterion is not met. 

 

17.  With respect to the fourth criterion, it is found that the respondent was voluntarily created in 1964  by chief officers of the districts and that it is organized by constitution dated October 4, 1964.   It is concluded that the respondent was not created by government. 

 

18.  The complainants contend that the respondent is a public agency under Yantic Volunteer Fire Co. v. FOI Commission, 44 Conn. Sup. 230 (1995), affirmed 42 Conn. App. 519 (1996); see also §7-314(b), G.S., (exempting from the FOI Act the records and meetings of volunteer fire and ambulance companies related to fraternal matters). 

 

19.  However, the Commission notes that the Yantic case and its progeny, as well as §7-314(b), G.S., deal with volunteer fire and ambulance companies which provide fire and emergency services to municipalities.  As described in paragraph 15, above, the respondent does not provide such services.  Rather, it is found that the respondent is much more akin to the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (“CCM”), in that it is a voluntary unincorporated association offering educational services to a municipality, for a fee.   The Commission concluded that CCM is not the functional equivalent of a public agency.  Docket #FIC1994-121, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, Connecticut Council 4, AFL-CIO v. Connecticut Conference of Municipalities (Dec.  29, 1994). 

 

                20.  It is concluded that, based on the totality of relevant criteria, the respondent  is not the functional equivalent of a public agency within the meaning of §1-200(1)(B), G.S.   Accordingly, it is concluded that the respondent is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission. 

 

            The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  The complaint is hereby dismissed.

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of January 25, 2006.

 

________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Ken Byron and The

Hartford Courant

101 Phoenix Avenue

Enfield, CT 06082

 

Enfield Fire Chiefs Association 

c/o Carl T. Landolina, Esq.

487 Spring Street, Suite 2

Windsor Locks, CT 06096

 

 

 

___________________________________

Petrea A. Jones

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

FIC/2005-199FD/paj/2/2/2006