FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

           

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on April 4, 2008, at which time the complainant and the respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

 

            After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

 

            1.  The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-200(1), G.S.

 

2.  By letter of complaint filed December 12, 2007 and amended January 28, 2008, the complainant appealed to the Commission, alleging that the respondent violated the Freedom of Information (“FOI”) Act on November 13, 2007 and January 7, 2008, by conducting executive sessions for the purpose of the “discussion of the site, or a lease, sale or purchase of real estate,” without specifying the parcel of real estate involved.

 

3.  It is found the respondent town council held meetings on November 19, 2007 and January 7, 2008.

 

4.  It is found that the agenda for each meeting listed an executive session for the purpose of “Discussion of the selection of a site or a lease, sale or purchase of real estate.”

 

5.  It is found that, during the November 19, 2007 executive session, the Town Manager informed the respondents of his intention to pursue a purchase option on property known as 55 Mechanic Street.

6.   It is further found that, during the January 7, 2008 executive session, the Town manager informed the respondents of the progress of his negotiations to execute a purchase option on the property.

 

7.  It is found that the town manager has the authority to enter into a purchase option, but that any purchase must be approved by the respondent town council.

 

8.  It is found that the town manager, who prepares the agendas for the respondent town council, scheduled the two executive sessions so that he could, in November 2007, inform the town council of his intent to enter into negotiations to enter into a purchase option for property known as 55 Mechanic Street, and in January 2008, keep the respondent informed of those negotiations.

 

9.  It is found that the 55 Mechanic Street property is adjacent to town-owned property, and is in an area designated for redevelopment.

 

10. It is found that the town manager did not identify the property on the town council’s agenda because of concern that publicity about the property might lead a speculator who learned of the town’s interest in the property to compete with the town for the purchase, thus driving up the price.

 

11.  It is found that the purchase option was executed on January 15, 2008.

 

12.  Section 1-225(a), G.S., provides in relevant part that “[t]he meetings of all public agencies, except executive sessions, as defined in subdivision (6) of section 1-200, shall be open to the public.”

 

13. Section 1-200(6)(D), G.S., provides that the public may be excluded from a meeting for:

 

… discussion of the selection of a site or the lease, sale or purchase of real estate by a political subdivision of the state when publicity regarding such site, lease, sale, purchase or construction would cause a likelihood of increased price until such time as all of the property has been acquired or all proceedings or transactions concerning same have been terminated or abandoned ….

 

14.  The respondents maintain that they are not required to place the name of the property they are contemplating purchasing on their agenda by virtue of §1-200(6)(D), G.S., which permits them to avoid publicity regarding the property if such publicity would cause a likelihood of increased price.

 

15.  The complainant counters that naming a parcel of real estate in a meeting agenda is not “publicity” within the meaning of §1-200(6)(D), G.S.

 

16.  However, it is concluded as a matter of law that naming a parcel of real estate in a meeting agenda is “publicity” within the meaning of §1-200(6)(D), G.S.

 

17.  At the hearing, the Town Manager testified credibly and without contradiction that publicity regarding the purchase of the 55 Mechanic Street property would have caused a likelihood of increased price.

 

18.  The complainant maintains that publicity does not automatically engender an increase in price, that lack of publicity can produce an inflated price, and that publicity can prevent back-room political deals.

 

19.  However, the complainant put on no evidence to support the arguments described in paragraph 18, above.

 

20.  It is concluded that requiring the respondents to name in their agenda the property they are intending to discuss in executive session, where publicity regarding such site, lease, sale, purchase or construction would cause a likelihood of increased price, would defeat the purpose of §1-200(6)(D), G.S.  

 

21.  It is therefore concluded that the respondents did not violate the FOI Act as alleged.

 

 

            The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

 

            1.  The complaint is dismissed.

 

 

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of November 12, 2008.

 

 

____________________________

S. Wilson

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

 

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

 

Bradshaw Smith

23 Ludlow Road

Windsor, CT 06095

 

Donald S. Trinks, as Member,

Town Council, Town of Windsor;

and Town Council, Town of Windsor

c/o Vincent W. Oswecki, Jr., Esq.

O’Malley, Deneen, Leary, Messina & Oswecki

20 Maple Avenue

Windsor, CT 06095

 

 

 

 

____________________________

S. Wilson

Acting Clerk of the Commission

 

 

FIC/2007-668FD/sw/11/20/2008