FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
COMMISSION
OF THE STATE OF
CONNECTICUT
In
the Matter of a Complaint by FINAL
DECISION
Joseph
Cadrain and Richard Westervelt,
Complainants
against Docket
#FIC1996-006
Gerald
Gore, Legal Affairs Unit, State of
Connecticut, Department of Public Safety;
and State of Connecticut, Department of
Public Safety, Division of State Police,
Respondent(s) December
11, 1996
The above-captioned matter was heard
as a contested case on July 25, 1996, at which time the complainants and the
respondents appeared, stipulated to certain facts, and presented testimony,
exhibits and argument on the complaint.
After consideration of the entire
record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:
1.
The respondents are public agencies within the meaning of §1-18a(a),
G.S.
2.
It is found that by letter to the commanding officer of the respondent
state police (hereinafter, “CSP”) Troop B, dated November 28, 1995, the
complainants requested access to inspect the following:
(a)
any documentation concerning an unauthorized recording by unknown
persons of a private telephone conversation between the complainants on October
20, 1995 (hereinafter, “recording incident”);
(b)
the duty rosters for October 20 - October 27, 1995; and
(c)
the rules, policies and procedures pertaining to discipline of CSP
officers.
The
complainants also requested in the letter a copy of the following:
(d)
any forms used to file misconduct charges against CSP members.
3.
It is found that by letter dated December 1, 1995, the commanding
officer of the CSP western district headquarters informed the complainants that
an internal investigation of the recording incident was underway, that the
recording incident had been referred to the state’s attorney’s office for
investigation and possible prosecution, and that the complainants’ records
request had been forwarded to the legal affairs unit.
4.
It is also found that by letter dated December 5, 1995, the respondent
Gore informed the complainants that they may be charged a fee for an “item or
service connected with [their] request,” and that in addition to the remittance
of any fees due, they would also have to provide written assurance that “[the
requested] information [was] not for use in pending litigation to which the
state is a party.”
5.
It is further found that by letter dated December 8, 1995, the
complainants informed the respondent Gore that their records request was
primarily for access to inspect records and that the only copy requested was
for forms used to file misconduct charges against CSP officers. Additionally, the complainants stated in the
letter that the information requested was not for use in pending litigation to
which the state is a party, and asked for prompt compliance with their request.
6.
It is further found that by letter dated December 15, 1995, the respondent Gore advised the complainants
that the requested recording incident records were the subject of an ongoing
criminal investigation and therefore exempt from disclosure pursuant to §1-19(b)(3)(C),
G.S.
7.
By letter of complaint dated January 3, 1996, and filed with this
Commission on January 9, 1996, the complainants appealed the respondents’
denial of their November 28, 1995 records request, and requested the imposition
of a civil penalty against the named individual respondent.
8.
It is found that by letter dated April 11, 1996, the respondents advised
the complainants that the requested duty rosters, disciplinary rules, policies
and procedures were available for their inspection and copying, but that no
decision regarding the disclosure of the investigation records had been made
because the investigation was ongoing.
9.
It is also found that sometime prior to the hearing on this matter, the
respondents provided the complainants with a copy of the requested misconduct
forms.
10.
It is further found that the respondents failed to make any claim of
exemption with respect to the requested duty rosters, disciplinary rules,
policies and procedures or misconduct forms.
11.
At various times during the proceedings in this matter, the respondents
claimed that the requested recording incident records described in paragraph
2(a) of these findings, above, were exempt from public disclosure pursuant to §§1-19(b)(1),
(2) and (3)(C), G.S.
12.
Section 1-19(a), G.S., in relevant part provides:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided by
any federal law or state statute, all records
maintained or kept on file by any
public agency, whether or not such records
are required by any law or by any
rule or regulation, shall be public records
and every person shall have the
right to inspect such records promptly during
regular office or business hours or
to receive a copy of such records in
accordance with the provisions of
section 1-15.
13.
It is found that the requested records are public records within the
meaning of §1-19(a),
G.S.
14.
Section 1-15(a), G.S., in relevant part provides “[a]ny person applying
in writing shall receive, promptly upon request, a plain or certified copy of
any public record.”
15.
It is therefore concluded that the respondents violated the provisions
of §§1-19(a)
and 1-15(a), G.S., by failing to promptly provide the complainants with access
to inspect the requested duty rosters, disciplinary rules, policies and
procedures and by failing to promptly provide the complainants with a copy of
the requested misconduct forms.
16.
It is found that the respondent Gore’s denial of prompt access to those
public records described in paragraphs 2(b), (c) and (d) of the findings,
above, was without reasonable grounds, within the meaning of §1-21i(b)(2),
G.S.
17.
It is also found that the recording incident records, as described in
paragraph 2(a) of the findings, above, are contained in the CSP’s internal
affairs investigation file #96-02 (hereinafter, “IA#96-02”), which file was
received in evidence on August 1, 1996 as an after-filed exhibit for in camera
inspection by the Commission, and which file consists of 89 pages divided into
seven sections identified as: (a)
Executive Summary; (b) Complaint Against Personnel; (c) Notification To
Personnel; (d) Investigative Report; (e) Action Taken; (f) Summary; and (g)
List of Exhibits. Those pages
identified as IC96-6-35 and IC96-6-36, however, are irrelevant to the request
as described in paragraph 2(a) of the findings, above.
18.
The respondents claim that the contents of IA#96-02 are exempt from
public disclosure under §1-19(b)(1),
G.S., which permits the nondisclosure of preliminary drafts or notes “provided
the public agency has determined that the public interest in withholding such
documents clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure.”
19.
Section 1-19(c)(1), G.S., however, provides that notwithstanding the
provisions of §1-19(b)(1),
G.S., disclosure shall nonetheless be required of “interagency or intra-agency
memoranda or letters, advisory opinions, recommendations or any report
comprising part of the process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.”
20.
It is found that the respondents failed to prove that any part of
IA#96-02 is a preliminary draft or note or that the respondents had, in fact,
determined that the public interest in withholding any part of IA#96-02 clearly
outweighs the public interest in disclosure, as required by §1-19(b)(1),
G.S.
21.
It is also found that IA#96-02 consists of inter-agency or intra-agency
memoranda, letters, opinions, recommendations and reports comprising part of
the process by which governmental decisions and policies are, or were,
formulated, within the meaning of §1-19(c)(1),
G.S., and that IA#96-02 is not otherwise exempt pursuant to that statutory
provision.
22.
It is therefore concluded that §1-19(b)(1),
G.S., does not exempt the contents of IA#96-02 from public disclosure.
23.
The respondents also claim that the contents of IA#96-02 are exempt from
public disclosure under §1-19(b)(2),
G.S., which permits the nondisclosure of “personnel or medical files and
similar files the disclosure of which would constitute an invasion of personal
privacy.”
24.
The test governing the applicability of the §1-19(b)(2),
G.S., exemption is set forth in Perkins
v. FOIC, 228 Conn. 158 (1993), as follows:
First, [the respondents] must
establish that the files in question are
within the categories of files
protected by the exemption, that is,
personnel, medical or similar
files. Second, [the respondents] must
show that
disclosure of the records would
constitute an invasion of personal
privacy.
25.
The Perkins decision also
instructs that the “invasion of personal privacy exception of §1-19(b)(2)
precludes disclosure . . . only when the information sought by a request does
not pertain to legitimate matters of public
concern and is highly offensive to a reasonable person.”
26.
It is found that the respondents failed to make the claim, or prove,
that the contents of IA#96-02 have either been made part of a personnel file,
or are the functional equivalent of, or similar to, a personnel file.
27.
After an in camera inspection of IA#96-02, it is also found that
disclosure of the contents of that file would not be highly offensive to a
reasonable person and that such contents clearly pertain to a matter of
legitimate public concern.
28.
It is therefore concluded that the disclosure of the contents of
IA#96-02 would not constitute an invasion of personal privacy within the
meaning of §1-19(b)(2),
G.S., and consequently the contents of that file are not exempt from public
disclosure under that statutory provision.
29.
It is found that by letter dated July 26, 1996 (one day after the
hearing in this matter), the respondents informed the officer who is the
subject of IA#96-02 that the records contained in that file “may be subject to
the requirements set forth in [§1-20a,
G.S.] relative to personnel or medical files and similar files” and enclosed a
form entitled “Objection To The Release Of Information Believed To Be Covered
By Protected Privacy Interest Pursuant to [§1-20a,
G.S.]” if he wished to object to the disclosure of IA#96-02.
30.
It is also found that on July 26, 1996, the officer who is the subject
of IA#96-02 filed an objection to the release of that file on the grounds that
there had been no final disposition of the recording incident investigation,
and that he had not reviewed the file.
31.
It is further found that by letter dated July 31, 1996, the respondents
first advised the Commission that the officer who is the subject of IA#96-02
not only objected to the disclosure of that file, but that he wished to be
heard by the Commission prior to any decision regarding disclosure of that
file.
32.
Section 1-21a(b), G.S., in relevant part provides:
Whenever a public agency receives a
request to inspect or copy
records contained in any of its
employees' personnel or medical
and similar files and the agency
reasonably believes that the disclosure
of such records would legally
constitute an invasion of privacy, the
agency shall immediately notify in
writing (1) each employee concerned
. . . and (2) the collective bargaining representative, if any, of
each
employee concerned.
33.
Section 1-21a(c), G.S., in relevant part provides:
A public agency which
has provided notice under subsection (b) of this
section shall disclose the records
requested unless it receives a written
objection from the employee
concerned. . . . Each objection filed
under this
subsection shall [contain] . . a
statement . . . that . . . there is good ground
support it and that the objection is
not interposed for delay.
34.
It is found that the respondents failed to comply with §1-21a(b),
G.S., by failing to notify immediately the officer who is the subject of
IA#96-02 of the complainants’ request, as required by that statutory provision.
35.
It is also found that the officer who is the subject of IA#96-02 failed
to invoke as the basis for his objection under §1-21a(c), G.S.,
that disclosure was of a personnel, medical or similar file, and that such
disclosure would constitute an invasion of his privacy.
36.
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission declines to reopen the hearing
on this matter.
37.
The respondents also claim that the requested recording incident records
are exempt from public disclosure under §1-19(b)(3)(C),
G.S., which in relevant part provides for the nondisclosure of records of law
enforcement agencies
not otherwise available to the
public which records were compiled in
connection with the detection or
investigation of crime, if the disclosure
of said records would not be in the
public interest because it would result
in the disclosure of . . . (C)
information to be used in a prospective law
enforcement action if prejudicial to
such action. . . .
38.
It is found that the respondents failed to prove that the contents of
IA#96-02 were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of
crime, within the meaning of §1-19(b)(3)(C),
G.S.; rather the records in that file were compiled in connection with an
investigation of alleged misconduct by a CSP officer under that agency’s rules.
39.
It is also found that by February 27, 1996, the state’s attorney’s
office had concluded its own criminal investigation of the recording incident
with a decision not to prosecute.
40.
It is therefore concluded that §1-19(b)(3)
(C), G.S., does not exempt the contents of IA#96-02 from public disclosure.
41.
Consequently, it concluded that the respondent's failure to provide the
complainant with access to inspect the contents of IA#96-02 violated the
provisions of §1-19(a),
G.S.
42.
It is further found that the respondents’ violation of the complainants’
rights to inspect IA#96-02 was without reasonable grounds, within the meaning
of §1-21i(b)(2).
The following order by the
Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the
above-captioned complaint:
1.
The respondents shall forthwith provide the complainants with access to
inspect the contents of IA#96-02, pages IC96-6-1 through IC96-6-34, inclusive,
and IC96-6-37 through IC96-6-89, inclusive.
2.
Henceforth, the respondents shall strictly comply with the public
records requirements set forth in §§1-15(a)
and 1-19(a), G.S.
3.
Within forty-five days of the date of mailing the notice of final
decision in this case, the respondent Gore shall remit to this Commission a
civil penalty in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
4.
The Commission deplores what can only be viewed as a continuing practice
by the respondents, and others in the department of public safety and its
division of state police, of willfully obstructing the public’s statutory right
of access to public records. Indeed, it
is unconscionable that the respondent Gore would inform the complainants, or
any citizen, that they must pay for a copy of the forms used to file misconduct
charges against CSP officers. Not only
does this kind of gross dereliction of duty reflect poorly on those officials
who are responsible, but it seriously threatens to undermine the public’s
confidence in the respondent agencies, whose very purpose is to enforce fairly
the laws of this state.
Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information
Commission at its regular meeting of December 11, 1996.
__________________________
Elizabeth A. Leifert
Acting
Clerk of the Commission
PURSUANT
TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE
MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION,
OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
THE
PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:
Joseph
Cadrain and Richard Westervelt
c/o Barry Boodman, Esq.
PO Box 8158
Stamford,
CT 06905-8158
Gerald
Gore, Legal Affairs Unit, State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety;
and State of Connecticut, Department of Public Safety, Division of State Police
c/o Henri Alexandre, Esq.
Assistant
Attorney General
110
Sherman Street
Hartford,
CT 06105-2294
__________________________
Elizabeth A. Leifert
Acting Clerk of the Commission
FIC
1996-006/FD/eal/121696