FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION

OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

In the Matter of a Complaint by Final Decision

Daniel V. Presnick,

Complainant(s)

against Docket #FIC 1996-057

Board of Selectmen, Town of Orange,

Respondent(s) October 9, 1996

The above-captioned matter was heard as a contested case on June 25, 1996, at which time the complainant(s) and respondent(s) appeared and presented testimony, exhibits and argument on the complaint.

After consideration of the entire record, the following facts are found and conclusions of law are reached:

1. The respondent is a public agency within the meaning of §1-18a(a), G.S.

2. By letter of complaint dated and filed with the Commission on February 20, 1996, the complainant alleged that the respondent violated §1-21, G.S., by adjourning its February 13, 1996 special meeting and asking the public to leave so that the board could discuss an agenda item, the “Orange Teachers Contract Arbitration Award” (“contract”).

3. The respondent concedes, and it is found, that on February 13, 1996, the board held a special meeting (“February meeting”) and the contract was on the agenda for that meeting.

4. The respondents argue that the board “recessed” the public portion of the February meeting in order to discuss “the collective bargaining strategy regarding the [contract],” as permitted under §1-18a(b), G.S.

5. Section 1-18a(b), G.S., defines a meeting as:

any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly
of a quorum of a multimember public agency, and any communication by or to
a quorum of a multimember public agency, … to discuss or act upon a matter over
which the public agency has supervision, control jurisdiction or advisory power.

‘Meeting’ shall not include: strategy or negotiations with respect to collective
bargaining ….

6. Section 1-21(a), G.S., states in relevant part that the meetings of all public agencies, except executive sessions … shall be open to the public.”

7. The respondent concedes, and it is found, that the board did not go into executive session at the February meeting.

8. It is found that the complainant refused to leave the February meeting room because the respondent was not convening an executive session, and the respondent had the complainant forcibly removed from the meeting room by the police.

9. It is found that earlier in the year the Town of Orange (“town”) rejected the negotiated contract that the Orange Board of Education (“board of education”) had approved.

10. It is found that the board of education’s discussions pertaining to the originally negotiated teacher’s contract were held publicly, and the decision by the town to reject the contract was made at a publicly held meeting.

11. It is found that the contract dispute went to binding arbitration, and the arbitrator’s decision was issued on or about February 10, 1996.

12. It is found that five persons other than the respondent board members were “invited” to remain in the room once the February meeting was halted, they were: the board of education chairman, the board of education’s attorney, the town’s superintendent of schools, and two board of education members.

13. The respondent concedes, and it is found, that much of what was discussed during the recess of the February meeting was restated after the public portion of the February meeting was reconvened.

14. Specifically, it is found that during the “recess” in question, the respondent board discussed what to do about the arbitrator’s decision, whether to “do nothing, reject the decision, or accept it,” and the consequences or probable outcomes if each of the aforementioned options was chosen.

15. It is found that at the recess in question, the respondent discussed strategy with respect to collective bargaining within the meaning of §1-18a(b), G.S.

16. Consequently, it is concluded under the facts and circumstances of this case, that the respondent board’s assembly during the “recess” to discuss the contract was a meeting within the definition of §1-18a(b), G.S.

17. It is concluded therefore that the respondent did not violate §1-21(a), G.S., by excluding the public from its discussions about the contract at the February meeting.

The following order by the Commission is hereby recommended on the basis of the record concerning the above-captioned complaint:

1. The complaint is hereby dismissed.

Approved by Order of the Freedom of Information Commission at its regular meeting of October 9, 1996.

__________________________

Elizabeth A. Leifert

Acting Clerk of the Commission

PURSUANT TO SECTION 4-180(c), G.S., THE FOLLOWING ARE THE NAMES OF EACH PARTY AND THE MOST RECENT MAILING ADDRESS, PROVIDED TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION, OF THE PARTIES OR THEIR AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.

THE PARTIES TO THIS CONTESTED CASE ARE:

Daniel V. Presnick

760 Riverside Drive

Orange, CT 06477-1726

Board of Selectmen, Town of Orange

c/o Francis A. Teodosio, Esq.

PO Drawer 668

Shelton, CT 06484

__________________________

Elizabeth A. Leifert

Acting Clerk of the Commission